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The rapid development in modern times of international trade 
has brought in its course a deeper appreciation of dissimilarities in 
the law. Because these differences give rise to disputes and mis-
understandings, serious efforts, both individual and collective, 
have been made to secure greater uniformity not only in the rules 
of private international law but in the various branches of com-
mercial law itself. The League of Nations has given this move-
ment for unification its strong support and as a result many 
countries of the world have today a uniform law for the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements and foreign arbitral awards, a 
uniform law of bills and notes, a uniform law of checks, and a 
uniform law of conflicts relating to bills, notes and checks. In 
the movement for the unification of the rules of private interna-
tional law Latin America has taken a preeminent place. The Con-
vention of Montevideo of 1889 on Civil and Commercial Law, 
which was ratified by Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay, constituted the first successful attempt in this direction. 
The work so auspiciously begun was resumed in more recent 
times by the Pan-American conferences and was carried to a most 
notable conclusion at the Pan-American Conference at Havana in 
*This article was prepared and read as a paper before the Eighth 
American Scientific Congress, Washington, D. C., May, 1940. 
tProfessor of Law, Yale University; author of The Conflict of Laws 
Relating to Bills and Notes (1919), Cases and Materials on the Conflict 
of Laws (4th ed. 1927), The Pan-American Code of Private Interna-
tional Law, 4 Tulane L. Rev. 499 (1930); contributor to various Ameri-
can and European legal periodicals. 
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1928 by the adoption of the Bustamante Code, which is now in 
force in most of the Latin-American countries. 
The question thus arises whether the Pan-American movement, 
which has done so much for Latin America in the unification 
of private international law, will be able to take another step 
forward, so as to bring about greater uniformity in the conflict of 
laws between Latin America and the United States. This discus-
sion is limited to a consideration of the law of contracts, with 
emphasis on commercial contracts, because it is in this field that 
uniformity ought to be more readily attainable than in any other 
branch of private international law. This paper deals only with 
commercial contracts in general, without extending the observa-
tions to the various types of special contracts, such as bills and 
notes and checks, contracts of carriage, and maritime contracts. 
The subject of contracts in general will present sufficient diffi-
culties for discussion within a limited space. For purposes of com-
parison it will be best to take the Bustamante Code as representa-
tive of the Latin-American law and the Restatement of the Con-
flict of Laws by the American Law Institute as representative 
of the law of the United States. Let us note, however, that 
whereas the Bustamante Code is an official code and actual law 
in a large number of the Latin-American countries, the Restate-
ment of the Conflict of Laws by the American Law Institute is 
unofficial. Its authority rests solely upon its intrinsic merits. 
A glance at the provisions of the Bustamante Code and those 
of the Restatement reveals striking dissimilarities. The Restate-
ment contains sixty-six sections referring to contracts in general.1 
They deal with the formation, transfer, performance and dis-
charge of contracts without performance. All matters relating 
to the making of contracts are said to be governed by the law of 
the place of contracting2 and matters relating to performance, 
by the law of the place of performance.3 Elsewhere in the Restate-
ment it appears that matters pertaining to the remedy are deter-
mined by the law of the forum.4 As regards validity, a unitary 
principle is set up, no distinction being made between capacity, 
formalities, and the intrinsic validity of contracts. How different 
the Bustamante Code, which contains, in Book I, twelve articles 
lRestatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) §§ 311-376. 
2Restatement of Conflict Laws (1934) § 332 et seq. 
3Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) § 355 et seq. 
4Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) § 584 et seq. 
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relating to contracts in general" and in Book II, three additional 
articles dealing with commercial contracts !6 It lays down no uni-
tary rule for the validity of contracts but applies one rule to 
capacity, another to formalities, and still another to the intrinsic 
validity of contracts. How can we account for this difference? 
How can greater uniformity between the two systems be brought 
about? 
In making the tripartite division between capacity, formalities 
and intrinsic validity, the Bustamante Code has remained faithful 
to a long established continental tradition. That capacity should 
be governed by the personal law was established from the very 
beginning in private international law, even by the early Italian 
writers on the subject. That the formalities of legal transactions 
should be sufficient if they satisfy the law of the place where the 
act was executed was recognized somewhat later on mere grounds 
of convenience. The question of the intrinsic validity of contracts 
has engrossed the attention of courts and writers in more recent 
times, by whom much light has been shed upon the subject. 
Although Anglo-American courts in early times relied a good 
deal upon continental writers on the conflict of laws, especially 
upon the Dutch writer Huber, traces of such influence being 
still observable, they soon went their own way and developed 
rules which seemed to meet the special need of their respective 
countries. In the matter of capacity, the English courts followed 
the continental view which regarded capacity as a part of status, 
governed by the personal law, the law of domicile. In the course 
of the nineteenth century this rule was abandoned as regards com-
mercial contracts in favor of the law of the place of contracting.7 
The maxim locus regit actum governing formalities was never 
adopted by the English courts and was introduced in England 
only by statute with respect to testaments. So far as any formali-
ties were required for commercial contracts, they must be found 
in the Statute of Frauds which has been interpreted by the English 
courts as laying down a procedural rule, subject to the law of the 
forum.8 
5Arts. 175-186, Latin-American Code of Private International Law. An 
English translation of the Bustamante Code is found in 4 International 
Legislation (ed. Hudson 1931) 2279-2354. 
6Arts. 244-246, Latin-American Code of Private International Law. 
7Male v. Roberts, 3 Esp. 163, 170 Eng. Rep. 574 (1800). 
BLeroux v. Brown, 12 C. B. 801, 138 Eng. Rep. 1119 (1852). 
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A similar development took place in the United States. Ques-
tions of the conflict of laws arose in this country chiefly between 
the different states of the Union, and because of the shifting char-
acter of our population and the consequent uncertainties regard-
ing domicile, the determination of capacity in commerCial con-
tracts with reference to the lex domicilii was found to be unsatis-
factory. From the beginning, therefore, the capacity to contract 
was held to be controlled on principle by the law governing the 
validity of contracts in other respects.9 As regards formalities, 
some of our courts followed the English view that the Statute of 
Frauds was procedural, but a different conclusion was generally 
reached with respect to the sale of goods. In recent times the 
tendency has been to regard the Statute of Frauds as laying down 
a substantive rule, so that the requirements of a written form for 
commercial contracts is governed by the law applicable to the 
validity of contracts in general.10 
Let us consider for a moment the subject, of capacity with the 
view of ascertaining what can be done to bring the Latin-Ameri-
can and the North American systems closer together. Under the 
conditions under which we live in the United States, it is not 
feasible to operate with the personal law in determining the ca-
pacity to enter into commercial contracts. The lex patriae is im-
possible as long as our law is not unified and the vast majority of 
questions of private international law arise between citizens of 
the United States. Nor is the lex domicilii practicable as between 
the different states of our country because of the difficulty and 
inconvenience in determining domicile. Commercial transactions 
are generally entered into without time for deliberation and do 
not admit of long investigations into domicile, which in the end 
may prove to be abortive. 
In Latin America the personal law has been retained in deter-
mining capacity, but no agreement has been reached regarding 
the question whether the personal law should be the lex patriae or 
the lex domicilii. The Bustamante Code leaves the states free to 
choose either.11 This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs and the 
question is whether it would not be possible to solve the difficulty 
9Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Marshall, 108 Iowa 518, 79 N. W. 282 
(1899); Greenlee v. Hardin, 157 Miss. 229, 127 So. 777 (1930). 
lOSee Lams v. F. H. Smith Co., 6 W. W. Harr. 477, 178 Atl. 651, 105 A. 
L. R. 646 (Del. 1935). 
HArt. 7, Latin-American Code of Private International Law. 
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in the matter of commercial contracts by adopting the North 
American position that the law governing the validity of contracts 
in general should determine also the capacity of the parties. In 
view of the fact that capacity has been regarded so long as a part 
of status, which is governed everywhere by the personal law, such 
a suggestion may seem shocking to Latin-American juristic 
thought, as involving a sacrifice of all principle. But is such a 
sacrifice actually demanded? The conception that capacity is a 
part of status rests upon the premise that disabilities are imposed 
for the protection of the individual and that the personal law 
knows best what protection is needed. Such protection, it is argued, 
should be afforded to the party under disability everywhere, 
which can be done only by means of his personal law. 
Granting that there is much force in this reasoning, does it fol-
low that it should be applied also to commercial contracts? In this 
class of cases the security of legal transactions plays an especially 
prominent role. The desire to protect persons under disability 
comes, therefore, into conflict with the requirements of com-
merce, which demand that business transactions should be up-
held if they are in conformity with the local law. Anglo-American 
law has resolved the question in favor of the security of commer-
cial transactions. The writer realizes that the step taken by the 
United States may seem to the Latin-American jurists too radical 
a departure from fundamental theory, and that the only conces-
sion Latin-American law is prepared to make in the interest of 
security of commercial transactions is perhaps that persons under 
disability according to their personal law be not allowed to set up 
such disability if they possess full capacity under the law of the 
place of contracting. This is a compromise position which has 
been taken by some continental countries as well as by the Geneva 
Convention of June 7, 1930, for the Setdement of Certain Con-
flicts of Laws in Connection with Bills of Exchange an9. Prom-
issory Notes.12 The acceptance of the above qualification would 
constitute an advance over the exclusive application of the per-
sonal law and would bring the Latin-American law not only into 
closer touch with that of the United States but also with the law 
of the other leading commercial countries. 
Complete uniformity in the matter of capacity would be at-
tained if the law of the United States could be modified so that 
12Art. 2 (2). 
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a contract, invalid for lack of capacity under the law of the 
place of contracting, would be sustained if it satisfies the law of 
the domicile of the parties. This could be done only if a distinc-
tion could be made between interstate and international transac-
tions. In contracts between the states of our Union resort to domi-
cile is impracticable, as we have seen, because of the uncertain-
ties connected with domicile. It may appear, however, that the 
domicile of persons engaged in international trade is more stable 
than the domicile in the average case where interstate transactions 
are involved, and if that assumption is justified domicile may 
furnish a convenient standard for international transactions. In 
fact, it might be possible to regard the place in which the busi-
ness is carried on, that is, business residence, as a substitute for 
domicile in determining capacity in this class of cases. A modi-
fication of our law in the direction just indicated, according to 
which capacity to contract would be determined in interstate 
transactions by the law governing the validity of contracts in 
general and in international transactions by the law of domicile 
or business residence, would have to be brought about, however, 
by legislation in the individual states or by treaty, for our courts 
have been disposed to lay down identical rules of the conflict 
of laws in both classes of cases. Such a result might be brought 
about by legislation in some of our states vitally interested in 
foreign commerce. 
The validity of contracts as regards formalities should not be 
difficult to resolve, and yet we find considerable divergence in 
the law of the different countries. The position of the English 
courts that the Statute of Frauds is procedural seems indefensible, 
there being no justification for regarding a contract that is valid 
in every respect, as unenforceable simply because it does not com-
ply with the statute of the forum. The American courts, as we 
have seen, were inclined to follow the English view except in 
contrac,ts for the sale of goods, but they have now seen the error 
of their ways and regard the Statute of Frauds today as affecting 
the substance of the contract and thus controlled by the law gov-
erning the validity of contracts in other respects. Foreign writers 
frequently assert that our law subscribes to the continental maxim 
locus regit actum in matters of formalities, but such assertion is 
incorrect. The maxim denotes that any legal transaction, although 
governed as to validity in general by some other law, shall be valid 
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as regards formalities if it satisfies the law of the place of the 
contracting. The rule was introduced as a rule of convenience and 
was not intended to set aside the law governing the transaction in 
general. With due respect to the origin of the rule, it is frequently 
held on the continent, therefore, that locus regit actum represents 
an optional rule. There is some difference of view as to what the 
other alternative is or should be. In France locus regit actum seems 
to be regarded as a qualification of the law of nationality, hence 
a legal transaction is valid with respect to form if it satisfies the 
law of the place where the transaction was entered into or the 
national law of the parties.13 In Germany, on the other hand, the 
option is between the lex loci and the law governing the validity 
of the transaction in general, which in the case of contracts means 
the law of the place of performance.14 A very eminent French 
writer, Professor Laine, after a most profound study of the sub-
ject, reached the conclusion that a legal transaction should be valid 
if it complied with the requirements of form either of the lex 
loci, the lex patriae, the lex domicilii, or the lex fori, and where 
it related to property, the lex rei sitae.15 Two cases decided by the 
Supreme Court of the United States would seem to suggest at 
first glance that our highest court has adopted an alternative rule 
in the matter of formalities. In Scudder v. Union National 
Bank/6 the Supreme Court states that: "Matters bearing upon the 
execution, the interpretation, and the validity of a contract are de-
termined by the law of the place where the contract is made." 
Some years later, in the case of Hall v. Cordell,11 the same court 
held that the law of the place of performance should govern the 
formal requirements of contracts. It does not follow from these 
.cases, however, that the Supreme Court took the German point 
of view and deemed the contract valid as regards formalities if it 
satisfied either the law of the place of making or the law govern-
ing the contract in other respects, that is, the law of the place of 
performance. There is no indication in any of our cases that our 
courts have adopted an alternative rule in this matter. In the 
two cases referred to, the Supreme Court actually laid down two 
13Barbey, Le Conflit des Lois en Matiere de Contrats dans le Droit 
des Etats-Unis d'Amerique et le Droit Anglais compares au Droit Fran-
~is (1938) 302. 
141ntroductory Law, Art. 11, German Civil Code. 
15Laine, Esquisse d'une theorie de la forme des actes instrumentaires 
en droit international prive (1908) 321, 674 et seq. 
1691 U. ·S. 406, 412-413, 23 L. Ed. 245 (1875). 
17142 U. S. 116, 12 Sup. Ct. 154, 35 L. Ed. 956 (1891). 
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divergent rules in the conflict of laws governing contracts in 
general, holding that the particular rule adopted applied also to 
formalities-the lex loci in the first place and the lex solutionis in 
the second. Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor 
any of our state courts has been inclined to follow the continental 
tradition by applying a special rule to formalities. They are more 
apt to allow the parties to contract in general with reference to 
either the law of the place of contracting or the law of the place 
of performance-they have done so more or less consistently in the 
usury cases18-which renders any special rule governing formali-
ties unnecessary. 
The situation is quite different from the standpoint of the 
Bustamante Code. Instead of allowing a choice between two laws, 
it requires compulsory compliance with the law of two states, the 
law of the place of contracting and the law of the place of per-
formance/9 thus multiplying the chances for invalidity. A more 
liberal rule is clearly in order, and as there is a good deal of prece-
dent for such a conclusion in the legislation of other civil-law 
countries, it should not be difficult to bring the Latin-American 
law into line. Professor Laine's suggestion may as yet seem too far 
advanced, but both Anglo-American and Latin-American law 
could well adopt the rule that a commercial contract is valid as re-
gards formalities if the requirements of the place of contracting 
or those of the law governing the intrinsic validity of the con-
tract are satisfied. 
If we turn our attention now to the law governing the intrinsic 
validity of contracts, the problem is simplified by the fact that we 
can consider the problem by itself. Capacity and formalities affect 
not only contracts but many other legal transactions, and the 
desire for uniform rules and symmetry in the law might cause one 
to hesitate to adopt a special rule with respect to contracts, even if 
it seemed to meet the requirements of international commerce. 
The intrinsic validity of contracts presents questions which are 
not seriously interrelated with other problems in the conflict of 
laws. They can be more readily isolated, but this does not render 
their solution .easy. The Institute of International Law has 
wrestled with this problem on various occasions without being 
lBSeeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U. S. 403, 47 Sup. Ct. 
626, 71 L. Ed. 1123 (1927). 
19Art. 180, Latin-American Code of Private International Law. 
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able to come to any satisfactory conclusion. Most courts and 
writers seem to agree that the intention of the parties should 
control in this matter, subject to the rules of public order. The 
continental courts especially are consistent advocates of this rule. 
According to some, the parties should be limited in their choice of 
law to the countries that have some vital connection with the con-
tract in question. Others give greater freedom to the parties. In 
the great majority of cases the parties did not express their inten-
tion and did not even think of the matter. In these cases some 
courts purport to find the "implied" intention of the parties from 
the circumstances, that is, the intention which they feel the parties 
would have entertained, had their attention been called to the 
question. But it is obviously impossible to ascertain a subjective 
intention that did not exist. The best that can be done in that 
situation is either to apply an objective criterion and subject the 
contract to the law of the state or country with which it has the 
most intimate relation or to indulge in a legal presumption, such 
as the application of the law of the place of contracting, or the 
law of the place of performance, or the law of the common domi-
cile of the parties. 
What has been the attitude of our courts in this matter and 
what are the rules laid down in the Bustamante Code? If we were 
to accept the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws by the American 
Law Institute as truly expressive of our laws, the answer would 
be that the law of the place of contracting controls absolutely and 
without reference to the intention of the parties. Section 332 of 
the Restatement expresses the general rule, in accordance with 
which the law of the place of contracting determines the validity 
and effect of a promise with respect to capacity, the necessary 
form, the mutual assent and consideration, any other require-
ments for making a promise binding, fraud, illegality, or any 
other circumstances which make the promise void or voidable. 
Here we have an extreme expression of the view that the law of 
the state where a contract is made necessarily determines whether 
a binding agreement has been reached. It represents the theory long 
entertained and expounded by Professor Beale, the Reporter of the 
American Law Institute for the Conflict of Laws, according to 
which the state in which a contract is concluded, even though 
it be localized there only by way of fiction, as in the case of con-
tracts by correspondence, has the exclusive power to attach legal 
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consequences to the facts.20 Our courts as a whole have not sup-
ported this view and have followed Story's view21 that where a 
contract is to be performed in some other place than the place 
of contracting, in accordance with the presumed intention of the 
parties, the law of the place of performance should control.22 
Some courts consider all the facts of the case and apply the law 
of the state with which the contract has the closest connection. 
In usury contracts our courts allow the parties to contract in good 
faith with reference to the laws with which the contract has some 
substantial connection, particularly with reference to the law of 
the place of contracting and the law of the place of perform-
ance.23 Our law reflects, therefore, to a considerable degree, the 
views entertained by the courts and writers of other countries. In 
the writer's opinion the parties should be allowed to contract with 
reference to any law with which the contract has a reasonable con-
nection, subject, of course, in exceptional cases, to rules of public 
policy. A presumption might even be inaulged that the parties 
contracted with reference to the law having a substantial connec-
tion with the contract that would support its validity. A recent 
English decision would allow them to contract even with refer-
ence to some law having no direct relation to the contract.24 It 
seems unwise to extend the autonomy doctrine to this extent in 
matters affecting the validity of contracts, except, perhaps, under 
special circumstances. There is general agreement that if all the 
facts connect the contract with a particular state under the law 
of which it is void, the parties should not be allowed to subject the 
contract to some other law. It seems equally clear that where the 
contracting parties are not on an equal footing the law may have 
to lay down a compulsory rule regarding the law governing the 
validity of the contract, or of a particular stipulation, without ref-
erence to the expressed intention. 
Our law needs clarification in various respects. It should make 
clear under what circumstances the parties can or cannot choose 
their law in matters affecting the validity of contracts. That they 
have such power in matters not affecting validity is conceded. 
20Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of the Contract! 23 Harv. L. 
Rev. 260, 267 et seq. (1910). 
21Story, Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 1846) 367, 432, §§ 242, 280. 
22See Pritchard v. Norton, 1{)6 U. S. 124, 1 Sup. Ct. 102, 27 L. Ed. 104 
(1882). 
23See supra note 18. 
24Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A. C. 277. 
HeinOnline  -- 15 Tul. L. Rev. 175 1940-1941
1941] CONFLICT OF LAWS 175 
Turning now to the Bustamante Code, we find that it lays 
down mandatory rules not only with respect to capacity and 
formalities, but also with regard to the intrinsic requirements of 
contracts. The effect of fraud, mistake, and duress is said to be 
subject to the "territorial" law.25 Illegality is a matter of "inter-
national public order."26 In contracts by correspondence, the law 
of each contracting party must be satisfied.27 No room is left for a 
choice of law in matters affecting the validity of contracts, no 
room for the autonomy of the will. In taking this rigid attitude 
Latin-American law, as embodied in the Bustamante Code, is at 
variance not only with the law of continental countries which has 
made autonomy the underlying basis of the conflict of laws re-
garding contracts, but also with the law of England and the 
United States. In requiring that the law of both contracting 
parties must be satisfied in contracts by correspondence, the Busta-
mante Code takes a severer stand than that taken by any of the 
leading commercial countries of the world. It makes for invalid-
ity, whereas it would seem that the great desideratum in com-
mercial transactions is that contracts be sustained as far as possible. 
Instead of upholding a contract satisfying the law of the place of 
contracting or the law of the place of performance, it goes to the 
opposite extreme by requiring that it must satisfy both laws. The 
autonomy doctrine has been attacked by many writers, but prop-
erly understood and limited, it furnishes a proper juridical basis 
for the determination of contractual rights in private international 
law. Moreover, its universal character is calculated to promote 
unity in the law among the nations, thus furthering the develop-
ment of harmonious international relations. We have in the 
autonomy doctrine, therefore, the clue to the problem how greater 
uniformity between the American Republics-Latin-American 
and North American-can be attained in the matter of the intrin-
sic validity of commercial contracts. In the accomplishment of this 
aim, both systems of law will have to abandon some of their pre-
conceived ideas. Our law will have to rid itself of the notion that 
law is territorial and that contracts are, therefore, necessarily gov-
erned by the law of the state where they are entered into, in con-
tracts by correspondence as well as in contracts inter praesentes. 
The dogma of the territoriality of law had been overthrown in 
25Art. 177, Latin-American Code of Private International Law. 
2GArt. 179, Latin-American Code of Private International Law. 
27Art. 245, Latin-American Code of Private International Law. 
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this country in large measure with respect to contracts prior to the 
publication of the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. The Re-
statement unfortunately adopts it as the exclusive basis for the 
determination of the validity of contracts and by so doing tends 
to retard its complete elimination from our law. It is to be hoped, 
and the writer ventures to predict, that when the Conflict of 
Laws is restated by the American Law Institute the second time, 
the autonomy principle will displace the present theory. The 
Latin-American law, so far as it is contained in the Bustamante 
Code, will have to give up some of the ideas contained therein, 
however sound they may be from a logical and theoretical stand-
point, in favor of a more elastic principle which will sustain con-
tracts. The adoption of the autonomy theory will serve to point 
the way. This may seem like giving up principle for mere oppor- • 
tunism, but this is not actually the case. The autonomy doctrine, 
as interpreted and developed by some of the latest writers who 
have given profound consideration to the subject with full know-
ledge of the decisions of the courts of many countries, constitutes 
no longer an "emergency solution," devoid of all principle, but 
rests upon veritable scientific foundations.28 
The subject of commercial contracts presents, therefore, a field 
in which it is possible for jurists of Latin and North America to 
cooperate with the view of bringing about greater uniformity in 
the law and thereby help to promote understanding and good-
will between the peoples of the American Republics. 
28See Battifol, Les Conflits des Lois en Matiere de Contrats (1938). 
